uc 



An Estimate of 

Tonnage Available for the Transport 

of Trans-Atlantic Army Cargo 

From August 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919 

* 



By 
DONALD SCOTT 



Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics 
Washington, D, C. 



1918 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1918 





Glass LL (! ..j 3 2. o 

Book , h \ . 



*i\\ 



(L 



An Estimate of 

Tonnage Available for the Transport 

of Trans-Atlantic Army Cargo 

From August 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919 



41 \ 



By 

DONALD SCOTT 



Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics 
Washington, D. C. 



1918 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1918 



Acknowledgment should be made particularly to Mr. S. Marshall 
Evans, of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, for his careful estimates 
of ship production ; to the Shipping Section, General Staff, for very 
complete information as to the performance of Army ships and for 
valuable assistance in the preparation of material; and to the Divi- 
sion of Planning and Statistics of the United States Shipping Board 
for their accurate records of our Merchant Fleet. Thanks are also 
due to the Bureau of Operations of the Navy Department; to the 
Embarkation Service and to the Office of Military Railways of the 
War Department; and to the Shipping Control Committee for their 
generous cooperation. 



SUMMARY. 



In the following pages is presented an estimate of the ftmnage 
available for carrying Army cargo overseas from August 1, 1918, to 
December 31, 1919. 

The result is here given in concise form: 



Forces maintained overseas. 



i >ead- weight 
tons of ship- 
ping avail- 
able on first 
of month. 



August, 1918 1,924,000 

January, 1919 3, 915, 000 

July, 1919 8,015.00*1 

December, 1919 12,063, 000 



i-hori tons 

of Army 

cargo lifted. 



507.000 
1,081,100 
2. 415. 000 
3.040,000 



At 50 pounds 

per man per 

day=| shuri 

ton per 

month. 



796. 000 
1,411,000 
3,220,000 
4,473,000 



At 2^ pounds 

per man per 
day=n.42 
short ton 

per month 



1,421,000 
2,574,000 
5.750,000 
7,238,000 



The outstanding feature in this estimate is the large and rapid 
increase which is about to take place in the size of the Army fleet. 
We are at a turning point in ship production. There is need, there- 
fore, for a thorough survey to see if adequate provision has been made 
for the many factors which go to make up so complex a program. 

Certain factors stand out beyond others as possible obstacles to 
successful achievement unless careful plans lor overcoming them are 
made well in advance. Some of these are being studied now; others 
are not. It is recommended that special attention be given to the 
following subjects: 

(1) To study and redetermine the shipbuilding program and in so 
doing to standardize the types of vessels and of all their structural 
members and equipment. 

(2) To take steps to insure the necessary supply of steel. 

(3) To the manufacture of all items of mechanical and other 
equipment in sufficient quantities and for delivery when needed. 
Delays in shipbuilding must not occur for lack of boilers, turbines, 
or such important nautical instruments as chronometers. 

(4) To increase the supply of skilled labor at the shipyards. 

(5) To study the best way of meeting the demand for trained sea- 
men and officers to man our new vessels. 

(6) To anticipate and provide remedial measures against the 
probable congestion of railroad transportation next winter. 

78030—18 2 (5) 



(7) To sec that the loading, repair, and bunker facilities of our 
home ports will he adequate for the great demand to be made upon 
them. 

(8) To study in particular our French ports; to determine and 
provide now for any necessary new construction and to work out the 
best method of coordination between the service of discharge at these 
ports and our service of embarkation here. 

(9) The Army should be asked to lay down a definite program, 
based on the shipping now available, and to take such steps as may 
be necessary to see that all supplies will be produced in sufficient 
quantities. 

(10) The Navy also should be requested to determine its program 
for the convoy of our increased fleet and to inform the Shipping 
Board of the armaments needed on our new vessels. 



PART I 



ESTIMATED TONNAGE AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORT OP 

TRANSATLANTIC ARMY CARGO, AUGUST 1, 

1918, TO DECEMBER 31, 1919 



(7) 



PART I. 

ESTIMATED TONNAGE AVAILABLE FOR TRANSPORT OF 
TRANS-ATLANTIC ARMY CARGO, AUGUST 1, 1918, TO DECEM- 
BER 31, 1919. 



This estimate of shipping available for carrying Army cargo over- 
seas from August 1 , 1918, to December 31 , 1919, is founded on records 
of ship production at yards now in operation and on records of the 
performance of our shipping, both Army and merchant, which have 
been kept for some time. The latter have given us the actual 'turn- 
around, cargoes carried, time under repair, and other essential data 
for each boat, and from them Ave are able to predict the service which 
can be rendered by our new fleet with a degree of accuracy which 
would not otherwise be possible. 

While detailed discussion of the basis for this estimate is reserved 
for later pages, a brief statement may be made here. The total 
American-controlled fleet has been determined each month by adding 
a careful estimate of new construction and of vessels otherwise 
acquired and subtracting losses from war and marine risk. This 
total has then been distributed to non-Army employments covering 
our trade requirements and other essential services, such as Belgian 
Relief. Allowance has been made for various delays in the delivery 
of the new boats. The balance remaining after these requirements 
have been met represents the total tonnage available for Army 
service. 

The cargo the Army boats will carry is based on records of actual 
performance. The different types of ships have been reduced to their 
cargo-carrying equivalents, and full allowance has been made for 
troop and animal ships. Allowances have been made also for in- 
creased repairs to the new vessels, winter delays, small cargo carriage 
of the vessels of 5,000 dead-weight tons or under and other limiting 
factors. 

(9) 
7NO30— 18 3 



10 

It is believed that a conservative estimate has been made and that 
the shipping available for the Army is quite as likely to exceed these 
figures as to fall below them. 

In Table I is given an estimate of the dead-weight tons of shipping 
available each month for the transport of trans-Atlantic Army cargo, 
together with the number of short tons which can be lifted. For pur- 
poses of comparison only, the forces overseas which this cargo will 
maintain are chosen on two bases: First, that of 50 pounds per man 
per day, which from all figures now obtainable sooms a probable 
maximum requirement; and second, that of 28 pounds per man per 
day, the figures used by Brig. Gen. H. S. Johnson, Director of Pur- 
chases and Supplies, in his report of July 27, 1918. The absence of 
any carefully worked-out data on this important relation has been 
striking. 

The volume of cargo lifted does not always increase uniformly with 
the increase in shipping. In some months more vessels will be 
homeward bound than outward bound, in the winter the new vessels 

built on the Great Lakes are ice bound, and the performance of 

the whole fleet is delayed by stormy weather. 

Table I. — Estimated dead-weight tons of shipping available Jar trans-Atlantic Army 
cargo, short tons of cargo, and number of animals this fill lift and over-seas force it will 
ihiiJnla'm, Aug. 1, 1918, to Dec. SI, 1919 (fan/.r,.. exciudfid). 



January 

February . . 

March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September . 

October 

November . 
December.. 



January 

February.. . . 

March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September . . . 

October 

November... 

December 

December 31 . 



19 is 



Dead- 
weight tons 
of shipping 
on first of 
month. 



n 769,000 

a 846, 000 

a 950, 000 

a 1,182,000 

a 1,420,000 

a 1,561,000 

a 1,718,000 

1,924,000 

2,116,000 

2,520,000 

2,881,000 

3,370,000 



3, 915, 000 
4,458,000 
5,003,000 
5, 554, 000 
6, 156, 000 
6, 855, 000 
8,015,000 
8,827,000 
9,653,000 
10,500,000 
11,303,000 
12,063,000 
12,842,000 



Short tons Number of 



of cargo 

lifted. 



« 122,000 

a 228, 000 

n 289, 000 

a 373,000 

a 450,000 

a 125,01)0 

a 536, 000 

597, 000 

SOfi , 000 

850,000 

979,000 

1,140,00(1 



1,081,000 
1,380,000 
1,434,000 
1,663,000 
2,087,000 
2,259,000 
2,415,000 
2, 879, 000 
2,925,000 
3,202,000 
3, 355, 000 
3,040,000 



animals 
lifted, 



20,000 
20,000 
20,000 
23, 100 
21,100 
22,200 
10,000 
10,000 
12, 600 
10,000 
10,000 
0,700 



( >verseas force main- 
tained— 



At 50 At 28 

pounds per | pounds per 

man per man per 



day= -i 
short tons 
per month. 



796, 000 
1,075,000 
1,133,000 
1,305,000 
1,520,000 



1,441,000 
I. 840, ooo 
1,912,000 
2,227,000 
2,783,008 
3,012,000 
3,220,000 
3,839,000 
3,900,000 
4.269,000 
4,473,000 
1,053,000 



day=0.42 
short tons 
per month. 



1,421.000 
1.919,000 
2,024,000 
2,093,000 
2,714,000 



2,574,000 
3,286,000 
3,414,000 
3,960,000 
4; 969, 000 
5,379,000 
5, 750, 000 
6,855,000 
6,969,000 
7. '124, 000 
7,988,000 
7,23s, 000 



a Actual. 



11 



ESTIMATE OP 

AVAILABLE SHIPPING, LIFTED CARGO, AND OVERSEAS FORCE 

MAINTAINED. 

July 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919. 

(Tankers excluded.) 

Available Shipping represents total deadweight tons available for trans- Atlantic 
Army cargo on first of each month. 

Lifted Cargo represents short tons of cargo above will lift in each preceding month. 

Overseas Force represents number of men which this cargo will maintain on basis of 
50 pounds per man per day, all construction material included. This equals three- 
fourths short ton per man p"er month. 



Thousands 
Tans 

13,000 
12,000 
11,000 
10,000 
9,000 
0,000 
7,000 
6,000 
5,000 
4,000 
9,000 
2,000 
1,000 



CHART I. 





















































































































































































A 


Vj 




















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V J 




















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fz 




■y 


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' ' I ' I.I I I 

Jan Ear May. July Sept Nov Jan Mar Hay JtOy Sept' lTor Jan 
1918 1919 



12 

The outstanding feature in this estimate is the large and rapid 
increase in the size of our Army fleet which is about to take place. 
The Army fleet will be doubled by December 1 and nearly three times 
its present size by March 1 . In two months new ships will be available 
for this service at the rate of 400,000 tons a month, and by the first of 
the year at the rate of 550,000 tons a month. After June 1. 1919, 
over 800,000 tons a month will be added. 

The magnitude of these figures will be better understood if we 
realize that by next July the Army service alone will include a tonnage 
greater than the total German merchant marine in June, 1014 
Six months later it will be more than one and two-thirds times as 
large. The whole of this fleet, greater than that which served the 
needs of Germany to all quarters of the globe, will be concentrated 
between France and the United Stales. 

The Army cargo which our ports here will have to load and our 
ports in France discharge will by December be double the loadings 
of July, treble by April, and in August next will be five times as 
great. 

We are clearly at a turning point in ship production, and the great 
increase about to occur demands that our horizon be scanned anew 
to discover what limitations, if any, may stand in the way of the 
production and utilization of so rapidly growing a fleet : for if such 
imitations exist, nothing but the most immediate and efficient action 
can prevent a breakdown which will proportionately reduce our 
military effort. Earnest consideration is being given to many of 
these obstacles and to adecpiate plans for overcoming them, but in 
other instances there is no convincing evidence that such is the case. 

There are here indicated only the more important factors which 
may stand in the way of successful achievement, but it must not be 
forgotten that in so complex a program no detail can be overlooked. 

ARMY SUPPLIES. 

The Army will undoubtedly wish to make a survey of the produc- 
tion of all supplies, since the tonnage which is now indicated as 
available for the transport of Army cargo is larger than the figures 
hitherto used and a change in the rate of production of supplies is 
often a matter of months. 

SHIPBUILDING. 

Recent investigations show that the most serious study will be 
called for to see that the amount of steel required for this great ton- 
nage is forthcoming without unnecessary interference with other 
industries Production must be stimulated and the supply directed 
with care and precision into the channels where it is most needed. 



13 

Provision must be made for the prompt supply of all mechanical 
and other equipment in order thai no delay may occur in their 
installation. Boilers, turbines, gears, winches, anchor chains, even 
oars for lifeboats if not timed to meet the needs of our prog-ram, may 
prove the one weak link in the chain. Chronometers and Other 
nautical instruments of delicate adjustment are not less essential. 
With shipbuilding planned on so large and rapidly increasing a 
scale, no time will be given for the accumulation of reserves. Struc- 
tural materials and all equipment must press closely on the heels of 
production, calling for prompt and continuous delivery. Are we 
sure that this great number of parts will be ready to meet the schedule 
laid down { 

Standardization should be carried to the highest degree possible. 
Reductions in the number of steel sections, of angles and channels, of 
shapes, of machinery and other equipment, of the types of vessels 
even, can be carried much further than has yet been attempted. 
This would permit a freer diversion of supplies to the point of greatest 
need, and might reduce by one-half the enormous stocks which must 
now be carried. These are now estimated at 1,000,000 tons of steel. 
Delays in transportation may prove a serious limitation. Have we 
looked forward to the railroad congestion which in greater or less 
degree seems inevitable in the winter months, when our whole Army 
program will be going at top speed ? In that event, relief may have 
to be found by temporarily eliminating the carriage of some non- 
essentails. If so, we should begin now to determine what these non- 
essentails are and to adjust these industries in advance to such a 
possible curtailment in transportation. 

The competent inspection of newly built boats to discover and 
correct faults requires the provision of many skilled engineers. In 
our present haste to place boats in service the thoroughness of this 
inspection has steadily declined. More time and attention should be 
given to this, as it is one of the causes of the abnormal delays for 
repairs which our new boats now undergo. Recently several of our 
new boats have broken down after sailing on their initial voyages and 
have been compelled to return to port. 

Labor difficulties must be anticipated and the proper machinery 
for their prevention or adjustment carefully worked out, The sup- 
ply of skilled labor for the shipyards must be increased. There is 
need of more calkers, chippers, holders on and bolters up. It was 
the opinion of one shipyard manager that he could increase his pro- 
duction 20 per cent with two more good ship fitters. The training 
schools established at the yards should be extended. 

In particular the size and type of vessels being built should be 
carefully studied. Vessels of 5,000 tons or under are uneconomical for 
long hauls, owing to their relatively greater fuel consumption. Their 

78030—18 4 



14 

coal hunkers leave too little room for cargo. The new Ferris type of 
wooden ships of 3,500 dead-weight tons, for instance, will have an 
estimated coal consumption of 34 tons per day, whereas a 7,500 ton 
steel vessel will consume only from 27 to 30 tons. 

In our trans-Atlantic service, where coal must be carried for the 
round trip, this means that the 3,500-ton wooden vessel will have her 
cargo space so cut down that she will lift but about 45 per cent of her 
deadweight tonnage in Army cargo, whereas the average of all of 
our Army vessels at present is 68 per cent and the most efficient 
types run as high as 72.3 per cent. 

Our estimated production of these small vessels of 5,000 dead- 
weight tons or less from July 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919, is as 
follows : 

Steel vessels: 

From July 1, 1918, to Dec. 31, 1918 391,906 

From Jan. 1, 1919, to Dec. 31 , 1919 1, 136, 728 

Wooden vessels: 

From July 1, 1918, to Dec. 31, 1918 889,000 

From Jan. 1, 1919, to Dec. 31, 1919 2, 326, 000 

Total 4, 743, 634 

Just what employment can be found for this great tonnage of 
small vessels does not seem to be known. To some extent, they will 
release larger vessels in our .coastwise and other short-haul service. 
A small number will be sent to France to carry coal from England 
for the Army. The limits of absorption in these directions will be 
soon reached and these vessels, unless the present program is changed, 
will have to engage in service which they are little fitted to perform. 
In our chart it has been assumed that the increase in these vessels 
up to January, 1919, could be effectively employed, but after that 
date it has been necessary to discount heavily the cargo-carrying 
ability of these small ships. 

A possible suggestion is the transformation of the 3,500-ton steel 
vessels to be built on the Great Lakes from coal burners, as at present 
planned, to oil burners. Oil can be carried in spaces in the ship 
which do not encroach on its cargo space and as on the average 
the Army is shipping measurement rather than weight cargo, these 
vessels could then carry their full cubic capacity. 

Our building program should be carefully reconsidered, not only as 
regards these small boats, but also in the light of the more definite 
information which will now be available as to our needs. On the 
latest outward voyage of the vessels now in Army service, the records 
give the following information as to the relative efficiency of ves- 
sels of different sizes and speeds: 



15 



Table II. 



Dead-weighl Ions. 



12,000 and over. 
11,000 I o 12,000., 
10,000 to U.IKMI. 
9,000 to 10,000.. 
8,000 to 9,000.. 
7,000 to 8,000.... 
(5,000 to 7,000.... 
5,000 to 6,000.... 
5,000 and under 



Number 
in service 



A verage 
speed. 



LI. 8 

11.8 
11.3 

10.7 
10.4 
10.0 
11.2 
10.6 
10.0 



Per cent of 
total dead- 
weight 
lifted. 



66.0 
66. 1 
6(5.3 
69.4 
72.3 
64.6 
61.3 
59.7 
55.0 



Effective 

average 

turn- 
around, 
in days. 



79.2 
71.7 
74.7 
76.2 
67.4 
64.8 

66.0 
61.8 
73.6 



Long tons 
transporte d 
per dav per 

10,000 dead- 
weight tons. 



83 
92 
89 
91 
107 
100 
93 
97 
75 



Are we producing the type of vessel most efficient in the carriage 
of Army cargo ? Have we sufficiently considered their adaptation to 
the limits of length, beam, and draft imposed by the French ports? 
What consideration has been given to the service these boats will be 
called upon to perform after the war is over and they are dispatched 
to the various ports of the world '( 

SHIP OPERATIONS. 

The problem of securing officers and crews in sufficient numbers 
and with the necessary training is one that must be solved well in 
advance of the demand. Here again .we meet labor problems that 
require careful handling It is estimated that it will take at least 
50,000 men to man the additional vessels we can place in service 
before the end of 1919. Can we secure this number by a volunteer 
system and have we planned the necessary schools and instructors 
lor their training? It may be necessary to draft them and to have 
them trained and controlled by the Navy. Our new crews, as a 
whole, are reported to come from classes used to better and cleaner 
living conditions than the regular sailor. Problems of the fore- 
castle have already arisen from this difference. Patriotism, the 
adventurous spirit stimulated in times of war, and high wages are all 
calling men to the sea who may not remain once the war is over. 
How can we best insure the manning of our merchant marine when 
peace is restored ? 

A special problem is presented in the stokehold. The difficulty 
of securing and retaining competent men for this arduous work is 
well known. The installation of oil burners, instead of coal, would 
relieve this problem and should be carefully considered. ■ 

The Navy should be informed of the increased size of the transport 
fleets now contemplated and make adequate provision for convoys. 
Whatever additions to its own service may be needed will have to 
be determined promptly. If an extension of the arming of our cargo 
vessels is necessary, much time can be saved by seeing that the 



16 

armament is installed concurrently with the mechanical equipment. 
A careful program for this work should be mapped out to avoid 
delay in mounting gnus on vessels already completed. 

Tonnage engaged in lifting our essential imports must be allocated 
with great precision in order that even and dependable schedules 
may be maintained, with their attendant economies in the use of 
shipping. Without such schedules the careful adjustment of our 
industries to restrictions which have been placed upon our supplies 
becomes impossible. ■ 

UNITED STATES PORTS. 

Our Army vessels now spend nearly as much time in home ports 
as in those in Fiance. For cargo vessels clearing in February, March, 
and April the average was 17 days in home ports and 21 days in 
French ports. Relief from congestion on this side of the water is 
being sought by the development of ports outside of New York, as 
well as of this port itself. In the two months of May and June, 
43 per cent of the total Army cargo lifted was loaded at ports other 
than New York. The use of these out ports should be extended^ 
but it should be remembered that the Gulf ports entail a longer 
turn around and the facilities of the Atlantic ports should be developed 
to the utmost. 

Fresh study should be given to all port facilities in the light of 
these new figures and particularly to our repair facilities, in order 
that these may be supplied both with equipment and skilled labor 
to meet the burden which will fall upon them. England's exper- 
ience in the spring of 1917, when her failure to anticipate her repair 
needs crowded her ports with vessels, should be a timely warning. 
It is agreed that our new tonnage, built under great pressure at 
plants new to this industry and operated by crews of little experience, 
will be subject to an abnormally high percentage of repairs during 
the lirst vear or so of their life. By next spring it is estimated that 
there will be constantly under repair in United States ports some 
. r )(M),0()() tons of new shipping, and this will increase through the year. 

Adequate bunker facilities for the coaling of this fleet must be 
provided. Last winter lack of prompt fuel supplies seriously delayed 
many vessels. To avoid any possible congestion in the stormy winter 
weather, a sufficient reserve should be accumulated at all ports. 

FRENCH PORTS. 

Recent cables show that the port facilities in France have been 
receiving earnest consideration abroad, but for several reasons a 
somewhat extended discussion of this subject is here given. First, 
these new figures for 1919 as to cargo carriage are undoubtedly 
beyond any estimates now in the hands of those in France, and there 
is danger, therefore, that these ports may prove one of the more 



17 

serious limitations on our ability to move this large tonnage. Sec- 
ond, if a study of these new figures should indicate the need of con- 
structing additional berths, the shipment of material will have to be 
expedited to get construction started before winter. Third, this great 
transportation problem demands a close coordination in organization 
between those loading and dispatching Army vessels here and those 
in control of the ports in France. The difficulties of communication 
and other causes seem to have stood in the way of the interchange of the 
accurate and current information which is necessary if our effort on 
this side is to combine most effectively with that of our authorities 
in France. 

This report agrees with the estimates recently cabled from abroad 
that the capacity of these ports for the next few months will be 
greater than was at one time feared. There seem reasonable grounds* 
however, for believing that their limits, without new construction, 
are clearly indicated. It is possible that plans have been matured 
abroad providing for other developments than those now under way, 
and that the great demand which our new shipping will make has 
been anticipated. It seems more probable, however, that in France, 
as here, the new proportions soon to be assumed by our Army fleet 
will make it necessary to think in new terms. 

Observers bear enthusiastic testimony to the remarkable work so 
far accomplished by our engineers. In the face of extraordinary 
difficulties, inherent to the rapid creation of port facilities on a coast 
whose sandy, gently sloping littoral is by nature opposed to such 
development, they have adapted and extended existing facilities, 
constructed new docks, and by constan t struggle succeeded in keeping 
nearly abreast of a cargo discharge which rose to 498,000 short tons 
of trans-Atlantic cargo in June. 

The very stress laid upon these difficulties, which though sur- 
mounted have not been removed, raises grave doubts as to whether 
these ports can absorb the 1,081,000 tons we can send them in Janu- 
ary, 1919, or the 1,663,000 short tons which can be lifted in April. 
These doubts are not dispelled by any estimates now obtainable, and 
the following table shows that if these estimates are correct the great 
tonnage which we now find we shall be able to lift will be very con- 
siderably beyond the capacity of the ports to discharge. 

Table III gives the best estimates now available for the discharge 
capacity of the French ports. 

78030—18 5 



18 





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• os a 



8§ 



cm" t-T 



■X — — -H 



sssg 

O 2 eo f 



|^ CO OO if 



c o e c = c 
— c c o • - = 
c * ic a t c 



<r — i.o c c c 

CCCICCC 



go oo 
O OC 

y- ooi^ 

— -f CO 



a i: u.^ : •- fe c - : 
s .g « « -/ — ^ a £ : . 

;° oeOo oJS = o c 



exEg • 

C — 0/ — ^ 

t/5 = ^ E 

qo; 



9 if '-a 

0; crc 



,- C 



■V%s<U- C° 



— a 
9i"S 



ss 



19 



ESTIMATE OF 

FRENCH PORT CAPACITY 

VERSUS 

t'ARCO SHIPMENT POSSIBLE. 
August 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919. 

French Port Capacity is shown in short tons per month both on the basis of 
Col. Wilgus's estimate of April 26 and on the basis of the estimate of this report. 

Trans-Atlantic Cargo shows the short tons of Army cargo from United States which 
available shipping will be able to lift. 

Total Cargo includes trans-Atlantic cargo and coal brought from Fngland to French 
ports by Army boats. 

Thousands 
Ions 



9,600 



5,800 



2,800 



£,400 



2,000 



1,600 



1,200 



800 



400 



CHART II. 











































J 


t J 
J * 


/ 










*v 


If ji 




. 0& 


*>*~K 










II * 


*** 




• 






^i/ 


*• — 0*"^ 


*& 




& 




?*£ 




><t5 


& 











































Sept Nov 
1916 



Jan 



Mar 



fiay 



July 
1919 



Sept 



Hot 



Jan 



20 



In addition to the cargo from the Unite 1 States, which the French 
ports must discharge, there is also the coal supply from England which 
is now coming to these ports. In June this amounted to 103,000 
short tons. It is estimated that with the increase in the number of 
locomotives the coal import will correspondingly increase. 

In estimating the cargo which will be discharged in French ports 
this coal from England must bo added to the trans-Atlantic Army 
cargo, and the total discharge so estimate I is shown in Table IV. 

Table IV. — Estimated total short tons of cargo lifted to French ports, including English 

coal. 



1918. 

August 

September 

October 

November 

December 

1919. 

January 

February 

March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September 

October 

November 

December 



Fns?lish Cargo from 

fcllglisn TInitfirl 

coal. 



Short tons. 
115,000 
130,000 
140,000 
ISO, 000 
160,000 



170,000 
180,000 
190,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200,000 
200,000 



United 
States. 



597,000 
806,000 
850, 000 
979, 000 
1,140,000 



1,081,000 
1,3SO,000 
1,434,000 
1,663,000 
2,087,000 
2,259,000 
2,415,000 
2,879,000 
2,925,000 
3, 202, 000 
3,355,000 
3,040,000 



Total 
cargo. 



712,000 

936,000 

990,000 

1,129,000 

1,300,000 



1,151,000 
1,560,000 
1,624,000 
1,863,000 
2,287,000 
2,459,000 
2,615,000 
3,079,000 
3,125,000 
3, 402, 000 
3,555,000 
3,240,000 



From these estimates it would appear that after December, 1918, 
port capacity will be less than cargo which can be discharged. They 
emphasize afresh the very large figures with which we shall be dealing 
in 1919. The indicated deficit for April, 1919, for instance, is over 
000,000 tons, which is greater than the monthly capacity of all new 
port construction which has been completed or is under way. 

The rate of discharge per berth per day, shown in this estimate, is 
low compared with what can be done under more favorable conditions 
in this country. However, when consideration is given to the great 
natural difficulties and the inadequate equipment and facilities, which 
retard efficient work at the French ports, these figures seem fair. It 
must also be remembered that this rate is an average which can be 
secured only by maintaining a considerably higher rate while vessels 
are actually unloading. Berths are vacant at times through failure 
of vessels to arrive or because of their inability to get to the berth, 
or discharge can not proceed rapidly because cargo from a preceding 
boat is still awaiting removal from the dock. 

A closer study of these limitations will show how serious they may 
prove to be. At the several ports these are: 

Shoal water and other difficulties in approaching berths at St. Na- 
zaire, Montoir, Nantes, La Pallice, Rochefort, Bordeaux, and Bayonne. 



21 

Inadequate unloading machinery, small cranes of slow operation, at 
Krest, St. Nazaire, Nantes, Pauillac, Bordeaux, Rochefort, Bayonne, 
and Marseille. 

Cramped dock space at Brest, St. Nazaire, Nantes, La Palliee, Roche- 
fort, and Bayonne. 

Inefficient labor at all ports except Brest and Marseille. 

Lack of sufficient rolling stock and trackage for prompt evacuation 
at all ports except Montoir and Talmont. 

The difficulties under which vessels are discharged are pictured 
vividly in the accounts which are brought back to us. Ships are 
delayed from entering harbors by lack of water and if not brought in 
at certain stages of the tide retard movements of other vessels. 

At the mouth of the Loire, St. Nazaire and Montoir are approached 
by a narrow channel having only 10 feet of water on the bar at low 
tide. At the Montoir dock, when constructed, there will be only 15 
feet at low tide. St. Nazaire is a basin which must be entered 
through locks. Nantes is 41 miles farther up the same river and 
shifting sand bars make the channel uncertain. Vessels of the draft 
of our Army ships must watch the tides closely to ascend the river. 
La Palliee and Rochefort are tidal basins with similar difficulties of 
approach. At Rochefort, 12 miles up the Oharente River, trouble is 
experienced with sand bars forming off the mouth of the locks. 
Serious delay is involved if the right stage of the tide is missed. 

Bordeaux, which we are counting on to handle nearly 20 per cent 
of our cargo, is 60 miles up the Gironde River. The shallow shifting 
channel can be navigated only on the tide and then only by vessels 
drawing not more than 24 feet of water. Others must be lightened 
first at La Palliee. Pilots will not move on the river when there is 
a fog. 

Bayonne is on the Adour River, 5 miles from the sea and here 
again the draft is limited to an average of 20 feet at high tide. 

The large number of idle berths reported by recent observers is in 
part accounted for by these difficulties of navigation. Under any 
circumstances some delay must occur while a discharged vessel is 
moved from her dock and a loaded vessel substituted, and this is 
increased by such restrictions on movement as those outlined above. 
To this must be added the impossibility of so perfectly timing the 
arrival of convoys as to prevent periods when there is an insufficient 
number of ships awaiting discharge. This could only be obviated by 
having a wastefully large number of vessels awaiting discharge. 

The unloading machinery is of small capacity and slow operation 
and of the type which would be expected by those familiar with 
European methods. Vessels unloading at one berth have at times to 
be moved to another in order that a more powerful crane may lift 



22 

out a heavier piece of cargo, and are then moved back again to re- 
lease the larger crane for other needs. This has been known to occur 
several times in the discharge of one vessel. There is a lack of a 
sufficient number of cranes. At the new docks in Bordeaux and at 
the new construction planned at Montoir and Talmont, more efficient 
machinery will be installed, but a radical change in equipment at 
existing French docks will come more slowly, if at all. 

Dockspace alongside the berth is too cramped for orderly unloading, 
and the result is often a confused piling up of goods in order to get the 
vessel emptied. One observer reports seeing a caterpillar tractor 
laid on a heap of cargo 30 feet high. This prevents prompt evacua- 
tion and the unloading of the next vessel. 

Evacuation is delayed by lack of cars, locomotives, and trackage. 
A cable from Gen. Pershing of July 31, 1918, says, "We have not 
half our present needs of 25,000 cars," and speaks of "the great 
importance of early relief, especially as regards our ear situation." 

The labor problem is serious. Unsatisfactory labor conditions 
exist at all ports except Brest and Marseille. Difficulties are experi- 
enced with the German prisoners and negro stevedores furnishing a 
considerable part of our labor. At St. Nazaire the officers report 
that it is impossible to get a day's work out of the men. 

Finally, if Germany should break through to the Channel ports, 
England would then inevitably be forced to move some portion of her 
army supplies through our ports. While this danger seems remote at 
the present moment, it is not an impossible event. Should it occur 
a most critical situation would instantly confront us. 

With this picture of French ports, we can better understand the 
limitations imposed by existing conditions and the difficulties under 
which our engineers abroad have labored. We have been discharging 
at the rate of approximately 400,000 to 500,000 tons a month. By 
next April the figures will be 1,863,000, and by July, 1919, 2,615,000. 
Better equipment and better organization, more rolling stock, and 
larger warehouses will assist, but the shallow channels, cramped 
approaches to the berths, and narrow dock space, which are to be 
found at most of the ports, present ultimate limitations which can 
not be removed. The need for securing additional facilities seems 
clear, and if these are to be ready to meet the deficit indicated next 
April, immediate action is called for. 

Unless this is done the situation which will confront us next 
spring will be serious. Idle ships at the rate of several hundred 
thousand tons a month will accumulate on our hands, and the whole 
of our industrial life will have been needlessly thrown out of gear. 
The size of our forces overseas will be held to a dead level, and the 
men we are planning to send to France in such numbers will be forced 
to remain on this side. 



23 



CHART III. 



ESTIMATE OF 

shippixc available; for army 

VERSUS 

SHIPPING FRENCH PORTS CAN DISCHARGE. 

September 1, 1918, to December 31, HUD. 

(Tankers excluded.) 

Shipping Available shows brans-Atlantic tonnage in Army Service. 

French Port Capacity is based on total short-ton discharge capacity, as estimated in 
this report, less capacity used for discharge of coal from England. The discharge 
capacity remaining for trans-Atlantic cargo has been turned into shipping on the 
basis that 3 deadweight tons of shipping continuously employed will carry the 
equivalent of 1 short ton of cargo per month from United States to France. 

Thousands 
Tans 

13,000 
12,000 
11,000 
10,000 

9,000 

8,000 

7,0,00 

6,000 

5,000 

4,000 

3,000 

2,000 

1,000 



Jan liar Uay July Sept Nov Jan Iter May July Sept Nor Jan 
1918 1919 

















































'///, 
























W/, 
























V// 




















//// 


//// 


//// 
















i 


Q 


f 


% 


















fj 






















i 


} / 


y/\ 


% 


//// 


1 


















% 


i 


//fs- 1 


&*■ 












// 






/J £- 


M$T 














/* 


>itf* 


* * 


j**» 


























- 1 

































24 



ESTIMATE OF 

OVERSEAS FORCE SHIPPING WILL MAINTAIN 

AND 

LIMITATION IMPOSED BY PORT DISCHARGE. 
August 1, 1918, to December 31, 1919. 

The overseas force has been based on 50 pounds of supplies per man per day, all 
construction material included. This equals three-fourths short ton per man per 
month. 

thousands 



Men 














CHART IV. 


4,600 


















4,000 












il 






3,500 










i 
4 


fj 






3,000 








J 


Y 






^* 


2,500 














<*• 




2,000 










^ 


« * 






1,500 


^ 


y 


>^/ -5 


jflP"* 










1,000 


/ 
















500 




















Sept hot Jan Jbr May Jaly Sep* *°* Jan 

1918 1919 



PART II 



GAINS AND LOSSES IN TOTAL FLEET. DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL 
FLEET. SHIPPING AVAILABLE FOR ARMY SERVICE. 



(25) 



















Total. 


July. 


August . 


September. 


October. 


November. ] December. 


,917,211 


13, 735, 268 


14, 564, 936 


15,416,785 


16,226,547 17,059,169 






928, 708 

440, 677 
175, 256 

84,700 
154, 075 

74,000 


943, 806 


969, 526 


930, 801 


956, 841 


1 , 002, 538 


12,913,849 


147. 004 

177,602 

85, 450 

188,050 

* 

45, 700 


454,411 
181, 040 

87, 250 
230, 025 

16, 800 


463, 022 
184, 474 

89, 550 
183, 755 

10,000 


471,631 477,459 
187,910 190,854 

91,250 92,700 
196,050 231,525 

10,000 ' 10,000 


5, 374, 636 
2, 686, 474 
1,186,250 
3, 154, 630 

382, 428 

72, ooo 




! 




26, 250 




! 




31,181 






l 




110,681 j 114,138 


117,677 121,039 


124,219 127,593 


1,744,, 542 


60, 000 

43, 143 

4, 783 
2,755 


60, 000 

46,600 
4, 797 
2, 741 


60, 000 

50, 142 

4,808 

2,727 


60, 000 

53, 504 
4,821 
2,714 


60, 000 

56, 683 
4, 836 
2,700 


60,000 

59, 944 
. 4, 962 

2,687 


1,005,000 

600, 292 
89,100 
50,150 


, 735, 268 


14, 564, 936 


15, 416, 785 


16, 226, 547 


17,059,169 


17, 934, 114 

















• 



Table V Estimated total dead-weight tonnage, exclusive of tanhers, under American control/rom July 1, 1918, to Dec. ■;/, 7979. 









wis 


















19111. 
















July. 


tugual 


September, 


Ootobei 


\,>\,'l,lt.<l 


Deeembei 


January. 


February. 


March. 


April. 


May. 


JlllH.. 


lulj 


Aii^unI . 

13, 735, 268 


Septcmboi 


< letoboi 


November, 

1(1,22(1,547 


Pooemboi 






i. 764,807 


i, 880,911 


7,091,800 


7, 111;, 1154 


7, 780,916 


S. 27(1, 574 


S. 787 500 


9,384,581 


'i 962 1..1 


10,604,724 


11.294.550 


12 089. 162 


12.917.211 


1 1,564,936 


15, 41(1, 7S5 


!, 059 169 






177, 00B 


275, 827 


124. 222 


Hill. Jli:; 


669, 134 


1101.(172 


11811. 44(1 


072. BOB 


739. 433 


789 608 


S97, 4511 


935 926 


928, 70S 


'it:;, son 


969 '.'i 


930,801 


956,841 


1 no- 138 


12,913,849 






Emergency Fleet deliveries ready for assignment: 
Steel 


29, 820 
60,850 
86, 280 


58, H27 
115,517 
12, SSI 1 
35,000 
27, 428 

12.000 
1, 376 


71,469 

110.2:1:1 

III. S 15 

157,500 

, Mill 

12. (Kill 

1 176 


11s, :::.', 
1:111,5.50 

411, l:l:l 

ins ;,iki 

12,000 
1,376 


141,206 

155,1132 
50,1121 

196,000 

11, 000 

12,000 
4,375 


17(1. ISO 
153,32(1 
15,21(1 
192,500 

18,000 
12,000 


18(1, 079 
1 17 492 

111 775 
30S. 500 


291. 173 
1111.058 
51. 875 
213.5(H) 


334 ss; 
133. 396 

111 150 
210, 000 


378.771 
150 892 
69.600 
181,345 
9. (KM) 


422. 1XS 
IBS. 228 

78. 200 
194.(140 

34. 200 


430. 1197 
171, 664 
S3, 4(KI 
1 73, 11(15 

;<; .'.00 


110,1177 
175. 251, 

84,700 
151.075 

7 1.CKKI 


117. (MM 
177, (102 

s;,, ISO 
188,050 

1 . 700 


15 1, III 

181,040 

87, 25(1 
230.025 

16,800 


1113,022 
IS 1, 17 1 

89, 550 

1 S3. 755 

10,000 


1, 1,681 

IS7.9IO 
1)1,250 

pii, 11,, 
III. 000 


177,4511 
190,854 


, ;;. |,63fl 
! 686 II 1 




92.7(H) 1 




231,526 3 154 630 




1 1,000 

12,000 

l, 876 
81, 181 


10,000 


Private construed 








72,000 
20,250 

81, isl 


































' w * ■'"" ' ,m n 





















1 


T tall 


60 902 


04, 938 


69, wis 


74, 1:; ■ 


711, 475 


84, 7 111 


92. 3(15 


94.75B 


97, 1 40 


99. 782 


102. S14 


107, SI7 


110,081 


114, 138 


117.(177 


121,0.1!) 


121,219 


127,59:: 1,744,64 








10,000 

12,802 

5, 285 


(8,000 
18,965 

5. 151 
2,822 


16,000 

11;. mi. 
5, 082 

2, 830 


19,000 

17,669 

1, 925 

2, 838 


52, (KM) 

19, 773 
4, 857 

2, sir. 


55,000 

22, 11(10 
4,833 
2, 853 


60,000 

21, 7511 

1. 77(1 

2, 839 


(10. 000 

27.088 
4, 843 

2, 825 


60 000 

29,447 
4,882 


60 "0" 

3I.9B9 
5.017 

2, 791) 


(III. OIK) 

34,894 

5. 1(17 
2. 783 


110. IKK) 

39, 747 

5.331 
2. 7B9 


(1(1. (KK) 

13, 1 13 
I. 783 


110. (MM) 

10, IKKI 
1 79 
2.711 


(10, (MM) 

50, 142 

1, sos 

2, 727 


(lo.ooo 

1,821 

2.711 


IK). (MM) 
2. 7(MI 


60,000 1,006,000 


Marine rink 
Steamers 


19,944 (KM), 292 




1, 962 s!l, KM) 




50, 160 




6,880,911 


7,(1111. Slid 


7, 11(1. 1151 


7, 780,91 i 


S. 27(1. 57 1 


s, 787, Mm 


'i 384 581 


9,962,431 


10, 604, 724 




12.089, 162 


12. 917 241 


13 735 268 










in 















78030—18. (Tolollow pag«25.) 



' 



■ ' • 



PART II. 
GAINS AND LOSSES IN TOTAL FLEET. 



Table V gives in detail the figures of ship production and ship em- 
ployment from which the estimate of tonnage available for lifting 
Army cargo given in Table I is obtained. 

These figures show the total American controlled fleet on the 1st 
of each month, followed by the gains and losses for the month and 
the total tonnage to be carried forward. In Table X this total is 
distributed to all essential non-Army services, and the balance re- 
maining shows the amount of tonnage available for the Army. 

A particular effort has been made to make due allowance for the 
many factors decreasing the efficient performance of this fleet. A 
detailed discussion of the various elements entering into this estimate 
follows : 

Present fleet. — This represents all vessels < ver 500 tons gross now 
under American control, whether through ownership or charter, and 
has been compiled from existing records of 1 11 such vessels. 

EMERGENCY FLEET DELIVERIES. 

I. STEEL VESSELS. 

The estimate of deliveries is based on two, three, and four turn- 
overs per year per way, except in the case of the Submarine Boat 
Corporation, where five turnovers are figured. The number of ways 
includes those completed and those which are expected to be com- 
pleted prior to January 1, 1919, a total of 393. No allowance has 
been made for additional ways which may be completed during the 
year 1919, although 46 are now under construction, and 18 more are 
contemplated. These ways are omitted to offset accidents or delays 
in the ways which have been included. 

The turnovers allowed each yard are based on the performance of 
of each yard during May and June of 1918, plus a reasonable im- 
provement, generally one turnover more than the present rate, in 
such established yards as are not now operating at full capacity. In 
yards which have started ship erection in the past three months, two 
and three turnovers are figured, but in yards not yet operating only 
two ships per way per year are counted on. Consideration has been 
given to the longer time required to build refrigerator and troop ships. 

(27) 



28 



Table VI. — Estimated steel vessel deliveries, tankers excluded, July J, 1918-Dec 
1919; number of ways; and number of vessels delivered by districts. 



31, 



Ways, Jim. 1, 1919 

Vessels to be completed July 
1, 1918, to Dec. 31, 1919 ... 



1918(6 months).. 
1919 (12 months). 



July 

August 

September. 

October 

November. 
December. . 



January 

February. . 

March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September . 

October 

November. 
December. . 



Total. 



Atlantic. 



Num- Dead-ic eight Num- 
ber, tons. her. 
393 234 



Dead-weight 
tons. 



1,503 10,033,517 801 i 5,861,375 



313 

1,190 



1,911,036 
8, 122, 481 



122 

679 



762, 716 
5, 098, 659 



203. 220 
224, 216 
292, 150 
374, 400 
405,750 ,. 
111,300 



464, 231 
533, 583 
603, 563 
672, 916 
686, 662 
701,033 
710, 406 
724, 151 
737,896 
751,641 
761,013 
775, 386 



59,640 

69, 136 
93,420 
145,820 

191,050 

203.650 



291,173 
334,887 
378, 771 
122, 188 
430, 697 
440, 677 
447, 004 
454,411 
463,022 
471,631 
477, 459 
486. 739 



Pacific. 



Num- 
ber. 

87 



343 



104 
239 



Dead-weight 

tons. 



849, 100 

2,030,622 



100, 700 
108,400 

141,000 
170, 200 
167, 900 
160,900 



116,058 

133, 396 
150,892 
168, 228 
171,665 
175,256 
177, 602 
1 SI, 040 
184,474 
1S7,910 
190, 254 
193.847 



<;reat Lakes. 



Num-\Dead-w eight 
ber. | tons. 
72 



359 1.292,420 



87 
272 



299, 220 
993,200 



42, 880 
46, 680 
57, 730 
58, 380 
46, ,800 
46, 750 



57,000 
65,300 
73,900 
82, .500 
84,300 
85, 100 
85,800 
88,700 
90,400 
92,100 
93,300 
94,800 



Tankers have been excluded from all figures given in these esti- 
mates. The present tonnage ol tankers and the program for new 

construction is as follows: 

Table VII. Dead-weight 

tons. 

Tanker tonnage, July 1 , 1918 1, 333, 594 

New construction, July 1, 1918 to Dec. 31, 191*. 175,505 

New construction, Jan. 1, 1919 to Dec. 1, 1919 627, 520 

Total 2, 136, 619 

This program is not only considered more than adequate ior oar 
needs but it seems highly probable from recent study that this 
program may be safely reduced by some 350,000 dead-weight tons. 
If so, ways, materials and labor w r ould be released for the building 
of over 400,000 dead-weight tons of cargo-carriers, since a tanker 
has a more complex structure and uses a greater amount of material. 

II. WOODEN VESSELS. 

It is estimated that 254 vessels, of a dead-weight tonnage of 889,000, 
will be completed in 1918. and 575, with a dead-weight tonnage of 
2,326,000, in 1910. Of this number all but 100 arc either under 
construction or authorized. More hopeful predictions have placed 
this production in 1919 at as much as 1,200 ships. 



29 



Table VIII. — Estimated probable wooden vessels delivered July 1 , 1918-Dec. SI, 1919. 



Ways, Jan. 1, 1919 

Vessels lo be completed, Julv l, 
1918, to Dec. 31, 1919 .'... 



1918(0 months).. 
1919 (12 months). 



July 

August 

September. 

October . . . 
November. 
December . 



Num- 
ber. 



254 
575 



Dead- 
weight 
tons. 



3,215,,000 



889, 000 
2,326,000 



35, ooo 
157, 500 
108, 500 l 
19(3,000 
192, 500 i 
199,500 



Num- 
ber. 



January. . . 
February.. 

March 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September. 
October. . . 
November. 
December 



Dead- 
weight 
tons. 



213,500 
210,000 
181,345 
194,640 
173, 665 
154,075 
188, 05U 
230, 025 
183, 755 
196, 050 
231,525 
169.370 



III. COMPOSITE VESSELS. 

Only those vessels now under construction are included, as the 
continuance of this type is uncertain. There are 30 vessels now T build- 
ing of 109,000 dead-weight tons. 

All the above estimates for steel, wooden, and composite ships are 
predicated on an adequate supply of material and labor. 

Time of delivery. — In estimating the time of delivery of Emergency 
Fleet Corporation vessels, an allowance has been made for the period 
between delivery and actual assignment to service. This time is con- 
sumed in placing the permanent crew on board, in mounting guns, 
and making various preparations for service. Other delays are caused 
by the demand of the Army or Navy Transport Departments for 
different mast designs, or by the Navy's requirement of changes in 
the quarters for the crew. At a meeting on July 31 of the district 
officers in the Steel Ship Division of the Emergency Fleet Corpora- 
tion it was indicated that quite a large percentage of the boats which 
had been delivered and accepted were not available for sea duty im- 
mediately, due to failure of the turbines and reducing gears. In 
addition, the vessel must often move from her port of delivery to the 
port of loading. Available records show this delay at present to be 
as follows: 

Days, 

Pacific Coast deliveries 15 

Atlantic Coast deliveries 16 

Great Lakes deliveries 29 

It is estimated, however, that the great increase in our fleet will 
result in much more serious delays than this, and the allowance for 
delay from these sources has been evenly increased each month until 
January, 1919, from which date a fixed delay of one month for Pacific 
and Atlantic deliveries, and six weeks for Great Lakes deliveries is 
maintained. 



30 

The time spent m transit from the Pacific coast and the (iron' 
Lakes to Atlantic ports is consi lere ! further below. 

Private construction. — The figures include only vessels now under 
construction, amounting to 98,100 dead-weight tons. Pew permits 
for private construction are now being given. 

New construction in Japan and China. — Contracts have been made 
for the building of a total of 373,620 tons in Japan, and 40,000 tons 
in China with certain specified dates of delivery. There are two 
contracts with Japan, and 31,192 dead-weight tons built under the 
first have already been delivered. The balance are entered on the 
dates scheduled. A delay of three months in deliveries under the 
second contract is estimated owing to the possibility of delay in our 
shipping to Japan the steel which is a condition of the contract. The 
Chinese vessels are entered on the dates specific ! in the contract. 

Swedish agreement. — Under our agreement with Sweden, there 
remained, on July 1 a balance of 31,181 dead-weight tons, still due 
us, and as we already have received nearly all these, they have been 
added. 

Possible additions. — No allowance is made for the following possib'e 
additions: 

China: 110,000 dead-weight tons under our option of increasing 
our contract by that amount. 

Denmark: We already have as many Danish vessels as will fall to 
us if the Danish agreement, now under ( iscussion, is negotiated. 

Norway: The additional vessels due us under our agreement with 
Norway, but now under charter to England, will probably be retained 
by the latter country as an offset to the disproportionate share of 
the Dutch tonnage which we seized. 

Peru: 46,150 dead-weight tons now under negotiation. 

Brazil: $5,650 dead-weight tons now under negotiation. 

War-risk losses. — The estimate for these losses in July, 1918, is 
based on the average monthly loss from enemy action for the second 
quarter of 191 8 of approximately 30,000 dead-weight tons, plus an 
addition of 10,000 tons to allow for increased submarine activity in 
the summer months. Information in the possession of the War and 
Navy Departments shows that the number of enemy submarines is 
at present decreasing, and the Office of Operations of the Navy states 
that wdiile some increase in losses may possibly occur from the 
transfer of enemy efforts from other regions to our transports, still 
they feel that this loss will not be in any measure proportionate to 
the increase in the size of our fleet, and that ari addition of 50 per 
cent to our present figure should cover this danger, so far as it is 
humanly possible to prophesy. It is also hoped that measures which 
are now under way to cope with this form of attack will at some time, 
not so far distant, result in reducing our loss. Accordingly, the loss 



Table X. - Estimated dead-weight tonnagt availabli forth u 



anxport of tram-Atknlic Army cargo from July i. 1918, to Dec. SI, M9, after providing for Mother requirements. 





July 1. 


Aug. J. 


l'ji'. 
Sept.l. oci. i. 


Nov. I. Pec. 1. 


Jan. 1. 


Feb. 1. 










1919 














Distribution: 

New vessels en route 


li. 784, 807 


6,880,91] 


7,091,800 


7, 446, 054 


7,780,915 


S, 270, 571 


8, 7X7 5011 


9,384,581 


9,962,431 


10.004,724 


11.294.550 


12 0X9, 102 


12,917,24] 


Au S . 1. 

13.735,208 


Sept i. 
1 I 564,936 


Oot. 1 

15, 110,7X5 


N,,i 1 
10,220,5 17 


IVr 1. 

I, 0,9 169 


Deo 
17.931. Ill 





































===== 


==== = 


I';" iIm Atlantic 

i (real Lakes-Atlantic 

Unassigned 


187,946 
96, ISO 


(Hi, 150 

.1 1,1,11 


:i. , 51i 
56, 545 


no, 233 
51,565 


136,550 

59, 344 


155,632 
100,054 


153.326 
145. 3-15 


147.492 
192 120 


1 1 0. 058 
213, 995 


133.390 
305. 145 


150 892 

374. 745 


I0X 22X 
152 915 


171,004 
117,750 


176,266 
120,350 


I7i 802 

121. 125 


181,040 

123. 113 


1X1. 17 1 
120, 103 


1X7,910 
[9 ,i,no 


190 864 

2XX, 300 


Trans Atlantic services 

Other trade areas — 


B67.529 


867, 529 


867, 529 


867, 529 


867, 529 


B67.529 


867, 529 


867 529 


X07. 529 


807, 529 


867 529 


807,529 


807, 529 


X07.529 


X07, 529 


X07, 529 


X07. 529 


,,, ,28 


86] 529 


Steamers 

Balling whwIn. . . 


2,967,881 

502, 927 
281,130 


2, 989, 836 
564, 487 

281,130 


2, 867, 282 
566,040 

351, 130 


2, 792, 956 
507, 585 
351, 130 


2, 718, 119 
569,123 
351, 130 


2. Oil, 390 
570, 641 
351, 130 


2 563, 325 

507 798 
351. 130 


2.566, 101 

501 959 
351. 130 


2. 508, 9X9 
562. 134 
351. 130 


2,571 xoo 
559. 323 
351. 130 


2. 574. 597 
556, 526 
351. 130 


2, 577 3X0 
553. 743 
351. 130 


2, 580, l i!i 
i60 9' ! 
351, 130 


2.5X2,901 
5 IX. 219 
351, 130 




2. 5XX, 372 
351. 130 


2.591.0X0 
5 III, 037 
351, 130 


537. 337 
16] 130 

1,73 


■ ,96 i, ; 






351. 130 


Bali available for Army. . . 

Army distribution: 

Trans-Atlantic Beel 

English Channel and European coast- 


4,918,548 


1,803,791 


I, soi. o-i:: 


4, 710, 998 


1.702,095 


I, 889,376 


1 lil.X 153 


1. 0X9, 394 


1, 709, X35 


I 7 XX 323 


4,875 119 


1,970,955 


4,639, 190 


1,646,388 


1,648,809 


1,051.235 


1,660, H9 




l . s:> 1 , 269 
I, 718, 119 


2,077, 120 
1,924,280 


2, 2S7, 757 
2, 115, III 7 


2. 705. 066 
2,520,216 


::. 07,x, 820 
2. 880, 9X0 


3,5X1, 198 
3,370,368 


4, 139,0-17 
8,916,207 


1,695, 1X7 
1 158,347 


5, 252, 590 
5, 002 750 


5.810.401 
5 55;; 5g] 


0.419. 131 
0. 150. 291 


7. 118,207 


8,278,045 

X. 015, 205 


9, 089, 880 

X. X27.0IO 


9.910, 127 
9. 053, 2X7 


10. 702. 550 
in 199, , in 


1 1 568, 128 

11,303, 2XX 


1 ! in,: li,; 


13, I", 178 
12,842,338 


wise Beel 

Added vessels 


132,840 
225,861 


162,840 

210,037 


171. MO 
117,299 


184,840 
873, 764 


197,840 
802, 378 


21(1. xlo 
557,849 


223,840 

550, HO 


230. 840 

557, 109 


219, X40 
503, X05 


262,840 
602, 730 


202. X40 
099 (170 


202, 840 
1.159,838 


202. 8 10 

811 836 


202, X 10 
X20, 217 


202.8 10 | 

X 10, 123 


202, XIII 


202. XIII 


202. 840 
,■1 80] 


262, x in 
, ho 


7H030— 18. (To face page 31.) 
















i umulatlve Increase 













Table X. — Estimatl 



Grand total. 



Distribution: 

New vessels en route — 

Pacific-Atlantic 

Great Lakes-Atlantic. 

Unassigned 

Trans-Atlantic services. . . 
Other trade areas — 

Steamers 

Sailing vessels 

Navy 



July 1. 



6, 764, 807 



137, 945 



Total. 



Balance available for Army 

Army distribution: 

Trans-Atlantic fleet 

English Channel and European coast- 
wise fleet 

Added vessels 



96, 130 

867, 529 

2, 967, 887 
562, 927 
281, 130 



4, 913, 548 



1,851,259 

1,718,419 

132, 840 
225, 861 



Aug. 1. 



6,880,911 



96, 150 
54, 660 



Sept.l. 



7, 091, 800 



95, 517 
56, 545 



867, 529 

2, 939, 835 
564, 487 
281, 130 



4, 803, 791 



2,077,120 

1 , 924, 280 

152, 840 
210, 637 



867, 529 

2, 867, 282 
566, 040 
351, 130 



4, 804, 043 



2, 287, 757 

2,115,917 

171, 840 
417, 299 



78030—18. (To face page 31.) 



:n 



from war risk has been LnGre&sed mouth by month from the July 
figure above mentioned until a total increase of 50 per cent is nude 
in December and thereafter this figure is niaint aine 1. 

Table IX. — American-controlled tonnage pynk by enemy nriim, (tankers excluded) and 
available enemy submarines fdr tht perib'd Jan. 1, 1917, to July Si, 1'HS. 





Available 

enemy sub- 
marines :il 
end of 
peril d. 


American- 

controlled 

tonnagi 

sunk during 
peri d. 




Available 
enemy sub- 
marines al 
end of 
period. 


American- 
controlled 
tonnage 
sunk during 
period. 


Quarter ending- 
Mar. 31, 1917 


[53 
1.52 
166 
175 


29, 550 
92,338 
61.254 

42, 7S2 


Quarter ending 

Mm. 31, 191S 

Tune 30, 1918 

July, 101 S . 


17S 
' 161 




June 30,1917 


36,516 


Sept. 30, 1917 

Dec. 31, 1917. 


S9, 669 

50,615 












1 U end o 


May, 191 s. 







Possible other enemy action. — At some time Germany may deter- 
mine to sacrifice a portion of her navy in an attack upon the Atlantic 
transports. The opinion is held that a portion of her fleet could pos- 
sibly get through to the Atlantic, and before being destroyed could 
sink a large proportion of the tonnage then at sea. No allowance for 
such uncertain and indeterminate loss can be stated in figures, and no 
attempt has been made to include it in the above table. 

Marine risk. — This has been accurately determined for the purpose 
of insurance, and it is stated by the Insurance Division of the United 
States Shipping Board that for other than Army vessels the annual 
loss from marine risk will be about 2 per cent for ocean-going steam 
vessels and about 6 per cent for ocean-going sailing vessels. 

Vessels in Army service are subject to a greater risk, due to the 
danger of collision incident to their gatherings in convoys. Con- 
sidering the danger from such maneuvers at all times, and the added 
possibility of accident with less experienced crews on our new ships, 
an allowance of 5 per cent per annum has been made as the probable 
loss from this source. 

DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL FLEET. 

In Table X the total American controlled fleet, as determined in 
Table V, has been distributed each month to the essential services 
which must be maintained and the balance remaining has been 
carried to the Army and represents the amount of tonnage which 
can be counted on that month to lift Army cargo. 

N"ew vessels en route. — Vessels built on the Pacific coast and on the 
Great Lakes must come to Atlantic ports before loading Army cargo, 
and these vessels are therefore shown as en route for this period, 
which is one month for Pacific coast boats and six weeks for Great 
Lakes boats. 



32 

The Great Lakes vessels, during the months from November to 
April, when the northern waterways are frozen, are held after delivery 
as en route and are not released until April, thus reaching Atlantic 
coast ports and becoming available for the Army in time. 

Trans-Atlantic services. — These include American controlled vessels 
which are in the following services: 

TABLE XI. 
Trans-Atlantic total 867, 529 

United Kingdom 93, 669 

( 'hannel 3, 800 

French 200, 725 

French Government 24, 448 

Italian 159, 790 

Italian Government 97, 872 

Mediterranean 33, 705 

Dutch 11, 080 

Swiss 83, 437 

Swiss Government 17, 490 

Belgian relief 100, 241 

Cross channel and French coastwise 33, 077 

Other, including Norway and Sweden, Greenland and Iceland, 

Persia, Portugal, and Spain 68, 195 

Total 927, 529 

Less Norwegian included above but later found not subject to 
our control 60, 000 

This tonnage carries cargoes essential to European countries and 
represents an adjustment between their great needs for commodities 
and the amount of tonnage which we can spare. We are under no 
stipulated obligation to furnish any of this tonnage except that for Bel- 
gian relief and Switzerland, but it is certain that we must to a certain 
extent see that the associated Governments are supplied with essen- 
tials. There is no reason to suppose that their essential needs will 
decrease, and, on the other hand, the Army program before us will 
call for all our available tonnage for some time to come. These 
services have therefore been carried as a constant amount through 
the table. 

Other trade areas. —The tonnage assigned to these services is en- 
gaged in carrying our essential imports from abroad or in maintaining 
necessary coastwise traffic. The assignment of tonnage for these 
purposes during the year beginning January 1, 1919, is as follows: 



33 



Table XII. 



Trade area. 



Tonnage 

in service 

July 1, 

1918. 



Trans-Pacific: 

American controlled 

Foreign cont rolled 

South American: 

West coast- 
American controlled 

Foreign controlled 

East coast- 
American controlled 

Foreign controlled 

Gulf . Caribbean, and West Indies: 

American controlled | <)2(>, 005 

Foreign controlled 87, 581 

Africa: 

American controlled , 55, 807 

Foreign controlled ' 36, 955 

Hawaiian and Philippine intei -island, American controlled 13,361 

Atlantic coastwise, American controlled 250, 775 

Pacific coastwise, American controlled 217,275 

New F.ngland coal trade, American controlled 398, 537 



553, 153 

708,902 



581,381 

72, 509 

155,240 

229, 058 



Total necessary tonnage. 



American- 
controlled 

dead- 
weight tons 
required 
in 1919. 



550, 000 



597,000 



300,000 



500,000 
14,758 



13,361 

300,000 
300,000 
155,000 



3,030,119 



In estimating the above requirements the actual dead-weight ton- 
nage necessary to lift our essential imports for 1919 has been deter- 
mined from careful estimates of our trade requirements next year, 
based on: 

(a) Data obtained in determining our 1918 requirements; 

(b) Further studies of these trades by the Shipping Board in con- 
sultation with the War Industries Board, the War Trade Board, the 
Food Administration, the Fuel Administration, the Army, the Navy, 
and other departments of the Government; 

(c) Trade hearings conducted by the War Industries Board and 
the War Trade Board. 

These requirements in long tons have been converted into the 
necessary dead-weight tons of shipping from records of actual turn- 
arounds, bunkers, and stowage. These records have been kept for 
some months. They have made it possible to estimate our tonnage 
requirements with a degree of accuracy which would not otherwise 
be possible. 

The total tonnage required for trade services, other than trans- 
Atlantic, as so determined, is taken as a constant from January 1, 
1919. The present tonnage in these services is decreased evenly 
each month from July 1, 1918, to that date. 

Winter delays. — Allowance has been made for delays due to bad 
weather in winter. This is estimated at 5 per cent for November and 
5 per cent for March, and 10 per cent each month for December, 
January, and Februar}^. Manifestly, good management will maintain 



34 

an even amount of tonnage in our trades wherever possible, and the 
delay of these months lias boon distributed over the year. It amounts 
to 3^ per cent per month, and will call for the addition of 101,004 
dead-weight tons to offset it. making a total required tonnage for other 
trade areas on January 1 . 1919, of 3,131 ,123. 

Repairs.— The time spent in repairs other than those which can be 
made while the vessel is loading or unloading is included in our records 
of turnarounds and provided for in this factor. 

Navy. — The Navy has made a request for the addition of 10 colliers, 
totaling 50,000 dead-weight tons, and four other vessels, totaling 
20,000 dead-weight tons, before September 1. and this additional 
amount of tonnage lias therefore been assigned to the Navy in 
August. 

SHIPPING AVAILABLE FOR ARMY SERVICE. 

The actual dead-weight tonnage engaged in Army service July 1 
has been taken as a base, and to this has been added the additional 
tonnage which will become available each month after provision for 
all other essential services. 

This Army fleet has then been divided into service between England 
and France to take care of Army coal requirements in France and 
trans-Atlantic service. The latter will consist of regular cargo ships, 
passenger ships of different types, and animal ships. In estimating 
the cargo which can be lifted on passenger and animal ships, they 
have been reduced to their actual dead-weight cargo carrying equiv- 
alent. 

Repairs on the present Army fleet are included in our turn-around 
figures. From February 26 to July .'il an average of 5.2 per cent of 
the total Army fleet was continously under repair in United States 
ports. This does not include those repairs which were made while 
vessels were loading and unloading. It represents approximately '■\\ 
days per round trip. 

It is the impression of men qualified by experience in such matters 
that new boats now coming forward will be subject during their 
first year or so to a very much greater delay from this source. Not 
only are these boats placed in service after being built at extra- 
ordinary speed by yards new to this work, but the inspection which 
they are given is less thorough than in normal times. Added to 
this will be the element of less skilled crews. An increase of time 
spent in repair to 2\ times the present delay has been made for these 
new boats, and their turn around proportionately lengthened. 

Winter delays. -In the winter months an allowance for delay due 
to stormy weather has been made, and the turn arounds during the 
months of November and March have been lengthened 5 per cent 



35 

and during December, January, and February 10 per cent for each 
month. As the Army is taking all the boats which it can get each 
month, it is impossible to distribute this delay over the whole year. 
as in the ease of trade vessels. 

Coal requirements. — In June 103,000 tons of coal were carried from 
England to France for the use of the Army by American controlled 
ships, totaling 132,000 dead-weight tons. The Army has estimated 
its maximum need of coal at 200,000 tons next spring. Shipping 
in this service has therefore been proportionately increased each 
month to April, 1919, and is thereafter carried as a constant. This 
coal will provide for the 268 additional locomotives each month now 
called for by Gen. Pershing. 

Troops to Siberia. -From information obtained from the Army this 
movement will be carried in Army vessels now on the Pacific which 
will continue to lift cargoes from the Philippines on their homeward 
voyage. No especial allowance has therefore been made for this 
service. 

Troop ships and animal ships. — From Army records of actual short 
tons of cargo carried by troop ships, it appears that these will carry 
about one-eighth as much as cargo vessels of the same dead-weight. 
Their turn around, however, is one-half that of cargo boats. Similar 
records show that animal ships will carry approximately 30 per cent 
less cargo than a cargo vessel of the same turn around. The cargo 
carriage of these vessels has been figured on this basis. 

Cargo carriage of Army fleet.— With the allowance above men- 
tioned, the trans-Atlantic Army cargo which can be lifted each 
month has been figured on the basis of existing records of stowage, 
bunkers, and turn arounds. The cargo vessels clearing in June carried 
68 per cent of their dead-weight. From February to June, inclusive, 
they averaged 64.-1 per cent. An average of 661 per cent has been 
taken as the basis of this estimate. 

The effective average turn around for cargo boats clearing in April 
was 70 days. The average from February to April, inclusive, was 
70.7 days. Seventy days has been taken as the average except for 
such boats as will use the port of Marseille, the turn around for which 
is estimated at 77 days. 

Small vessels. — Finally, an allowance has been made for the small 
vessels of 5,000 dead-weight tons or less. Up to January, 1011). it is 
assumed that our production of these can be absorbed in some reason- 
ably efficient employment. A discount of 15 per cent is made on the 
carrying capacity of these vessels coming forward after that date, 
as these ships, whether they go to the Army or indirectly release 
other boats for the Army, will undoubtedly have to engage 1 in longer 
hauls. 

o 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




